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Chapter 5
Revisited Frontiers: The Bakken, the Plains, 
Potential Futures, and Real Pasts 
Sebastian Braun
Thousands of emigrants, as our magazines have told us again and again, 
are thronging annually to the great plains of the Northwest, where wheat-
farming has offered the home-seeker great financial opportunities. All 
Americans rejoice that these thousands of home-seekers are able to establish 
themselves financially. On the other hand, residents of the East, the South, 
or the Pacific Coast, who love a pleasing diversity of hill and dale, grove and 
meadow, lake and river, cannot but regret that millions of their fellows are 
doomed to live on the monotonous Western plain, and to gaze daily on a view 
which includes no hill, no valley, no grove of trees, no water, nothing but earth 
and wheat.
Wallace Craig (1908)
During the Bakken oil boom beginning in 2008, people from all over the 
United States would once again flock to North Dakota, lured by eco-
nomic possibilities. In this boom, however, images of monotonous doom 
have had no place. In the curious historical frame of post-terror inse-
curities and anger, of rising, if reluctant, acknowledgment that climate 
change has real consequences, of post-Iraq realizations that it might not 
be possible to truly control oil abroad, and of living through an economic 
depression that wiped away jobs (yet left wealth intact), messages about 
the Bakken have been very clear. The oil boom, while a temporary in-
convenience, has helped North Dakota stay out of economic trouble, has 
brought a population increase, has revitalized the state, and has put the 
state on the map. North Dakota became the poster child for the Amer-
ican dream after having languished in national amnesia, or worse, as the 
poster child for lonely abandonment, for decades. The message came 
(and comes) from official and unofficial state channels, was (and is, al-
though with more question marks) picked up by the media, as well as 
by educational institutions. The Bakken is exciting, it is a chance to start 
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over, it is a new chapter for the state, and all of this is made possible by 
new technology: hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling. Here, I will 
not try to evaluate the claims made about economic, ecological, or social 
impact. I will not attempt to dissect and deconstruct political statements. 
I will not critique well counts, tax agreements, pipelines, flaring prac-
tices, or roads. All of these issues need to be addressed. However, in this 
text, I will simply put the Bakken into its context as a resource extraction 
boom. Booms—and busts, which people often forget in the excitement 
of a developing boom—are nothing new, and so, it would seem, a state 
undergoing a resource boom would be able to learn a lot from the expe-
riences of past booms—and busts. 
Resource booms are nothing new to North Dakota. In fact, the re-
sponse of many communities in the Bakken region to the developing 
boom in its early years was guided by the experiences with the last oil 
boom, in the early 1980s, which ended in a bust very quickly. Not sure 
whether this new boom would last, experienced residents decided to 
adopt a wait-and-see attitude. Instead of risking investments into infra-
structure that might lead to financial troubles again, perhaps the boom 
would blow over, and once the workers and their machines were gone, the 
communities could emerge more or less intact. This attitude, of course, 
shaped the response by the state, which placed considerable emphasis on 
the long-term nature of the boom (preferring not to speak of a boom, 
instead predicting that these developments would increase the population 
in communities three-fold, for the long term). Local challenges became 
regional opportunities, and this new boom was nothing like the earlier 
one. Hence, historical models would only be misleading. A new society 
was being built, with new technology, opening new opportunities. In fact, 
even if the events would not benefit the communities they were going to 
directly affect, they would at least provide security—energy security—to 
the rest of the nation. The potential futures projected onto graphs and 
into newspapers, onto whiteboards and screens, and most importantly 
into dreams and over frustrations, were millennial and sometimes bor-
dering on the messianic. 
The history of the United States, is, of course, permeated with the 
idea of building new societies, a shining city on the hill, the new Jeru-
salem—communities that would not be linked to historical precedent. 
Of this mythical American project, and the stories that accompany it, Zi-
auddin Sardar and Merryl Wyn Davies (2002, 207–8) have written that 
the “most hateful of all acts of ‘knowledgable ignorance’ is the failure 
to examine history and to acknowledge that deeds done to others in the 
name of virtue have actually done great harm.” Working, teaching, and 
writing as an anthropologist in a department of American Indian Studies, 
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and thus entering into dialogue with those kinds of deeds every day, I 
have to agree. The world is complex, history is complex, motivations for 
action are complex. Nobody asks that any action taken cannot hurt any-
body. But the painting of a new canvas, no matter how grand, virtuous, 
or well-meaning, is never isolated from history, nor disconnected from 
people in communities. 
Frontiers
The Bakken boom, far from being something terribly new, is in fact 
simply a revisitation of the “frontier” to the northern plains, a region 
that has seen different waves of frontier booms based on natural resource 
extraction for centuries. Thinking about frontiers in terms of settlement 
or demographics is to use the wrong category. In a superficial reading 
of Fredrick Jackson Turner ([1920] 1996) or the Buffalo Commons pre-
diction (Popper and Popper 1987), demographic change might appear 
to be the factor determining whether frontiers open or close. However, 
although population changes might be one of the consequences of booms 
and busts, it is not population density that defines a frontier. What makes 
a frontier is, most often, a resource boom. Turner ([1920] 1996, 147) actu-
ally did connect the frontier to the industrialization of a landscape: “The 
transcontinental railroad, the bonanza farm, the steam plow, harvester, 
and thresher, the ‘league-long furrow,’ and the vast cattle ranches, all sug-
gested spacious combination and systematization of industry.” Frontiers 
do rearrange landscapes, as Fredric Jameson (1998) has pointed out, and 
it is not simply the physical landscape that is altered: legal, cultural, so-
cial, political, and spiritual landscapes are affected as well (Braun 2008, 
210–14). Resource frontiers do not simply extract resources and then dis-
appear without a trace. They extract resources and leave a fundamentally 
changed environment. On the northern plains, the resources have taken 
diverse forms: in no particular order, fur, gold, water, hides, land, ura-
nium, buffalo bones, coal, and, for quite a while now, oil. 
Oil was first sought and found in Montana in the early twentieth 
century. Between 1915 and 1920, several oil and gas wells became oper-
ational in east-central Montana between Lewistown, Billings, and Miles 
City (Rowe 1920). The discovery of the Cat Creek field in 1920 began 
a boom that lasted several years. Investors in one company saw a 9,500 
percent return on investments over seven years. The boom, however, 
did not last. No new major fields were discovered, and the onset of the 
great depression in the late 1920s busted the developments. World War 
II meant a renewed interest in exploration, which was prolonged into the 
1950s (Darrow 1956). In North Dakota, too, oil exploration started in the 
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1910s, expanded in the early 1920s, and was revived and focused after the 
war (Thom 1952). While a North Dakota well produced a single pint of 
oil in 1950, the first commercial well in the Williston Basin was drilled 
in Manitoba in 1951, followed that same year by wells in North Dakota 
and Montana (Fox and Matiniuk 1992; Laird 1962). The following boom 
lasted into the early 1960s, but then production decreased into the 1970s. 
New discoveries together with the OPEC crisis then led to a renewed oil 
boom into the early 1980s (Anderson et al. 1982), when it went bust. This 
was the last oil boom before the current Bakken boom, which started 
in earnest around 2009. It is this last boom, and the experiences that 
longtime residents made at that time, that informed at least the initial 
reactions to the contemporary Bakken boom.
 As in most places, frontiers in North America have been waves of 
expansion and retraction of state control, of procedural landscapes (Braun 
2013). States, however, let private companies or individuals interested in 
resources take the lead and limit their presence to licensing, permitting, 
and, if necessary, the enforcement of policies, laws, and territorial con-
trol. This is an old pattern of European colonial expansion, seen in the 
repartimiento and encomienda system of the Spanish conquest (e.g., Service 
1951; Pastore 1997), and then its proto-capitalist English, Dutch, and 
French system of trading companies (MacLeod 1967), and its American 
descendants of free market governance. As one author points out, “The 
conquest and colonisation of America, therefore, was a joint venture be-
tween the Spanish state and private entrepreneurs” (Pastore 1997, 333). 
The same is true for most other European colonial efforts, as well as 
for the United States. On the northern plains, the first encounters with 
this developing global capitalist market system that brought wealth and 
power, unknown risks, and ultimately dependency, occurred during the 
early fur trade, when both British and French companies explored the 
region, established posts and trade relationships, and began a boom cycle. 
Native peoples in the region thus have experiences with proto-industrial 
and industrial extraction economies within a global context that stretch 
back at least three hundred years (Ray 1998). Different resources cre-
ated booms and frontiers in different regions in North America. They all, 
however, demanded adaptations, commodified and stripped the resources, 
and created dependencies that could be exploited when the booms busted 
(e.g., Milloy 1988; Braund 1993; Gallay 2002). Frontiers were primarily 
an economic enterprise. They did not establish total political control at 
once, nor were they one-sided, as “colonialism was seldom if ever im-
posed but instead built through interactions” (DuVal 2006, 47). Frontiers, 
however, returned, often in waves, dependent on the need for new re-
sources (see Braun 2013). While this pattern is observable all around the 
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globe, the northern plains provide a great example of it, and the current 
Bakken oil boom is but one historical manifestation. 
Most booms and frontiers do not originate from the discovery of new 
resources (unless the value of that resource is, at the time, very high), but 
from a change in economic value of a known resource. The fur trade was 
not driven by the existence of fur-bearing animals, but by the fashion 
demands in Europe. The buffalo hide boom was driven by the new value 
for hides once they could be industrially processed. The buffalo bones 
boom was driven by the demand for fertilizer. Energy booms are sim-
ilarly driven by specific demands. Once the demand or the value falls 
(which is not always the same thing, as natural resources are extracted in 
a global context), that particular resource boom goes bust. If the value 
stays the same, however, the boom goes on for as long as the resource 
lasts. Particular frontiers thus move over landscapes, and the local boom 
economies are always dependent on global economic values outside their 
control. Nobody should understand that better than those who have to 
estimate property values. “The oil economy can be fickle,” as one banker 
in North Dakota put it (Ustinova and Louis 2013). In the Marcellus Shale 
gas boom, the more conservative banks are calculating mortgage risks 
based on the assumption that the boom disappears. Others only value 20 
percent of royalty income in their appraisals (Scarborough 2012). Com-
munity reactions to the Bakken oil boom at least initially took a similar 
approach. Communities did not want to invest in new infrastructure if the 
boom would not last as happened in the 1980s, and as a result commu-
nities would become insolvent after the bust. After a while, however, the 
influx of people and wealth can no longer be ignored because it disrupts 
and paralyzes life as people knew it.
Studies of social impacts of natural resource extraction on local com-
munities were developed in Canada, Australia, and Alaska, mostly in the 
1970s, and mostly in the context of indigenous communities affected by 
mining, oil extraction, or pipeline construction. The most significant of 
these studies, and in many ways the model, was the Berger inquiry into 
the Mackenzie River valley pipeline in the Yukon Territory (Young 1995, 
184–88). The report, titled “Northern Frontier, Northern Homeland,” 
demonstrates that frontiers are not wilderness areas becoming settled, but 
the territories of people making their homes there (Nuttall 2010, 62–70; 
see also Watkins 1977). In some situations, because of treaties, sovereign 
status, special legal status, or other considerations, it is important that in 
many cases, it is indigenous peoples that are affected by resource fron-
tiers. However, implications are the same whether locals are indigenous 
or not. Frontiers exist as frontiers for outsiders, on the same land that is 
home to locals. The imposition of frontiers, then, already showcases that 
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they are an expression of power: the power to transform homes into a 
frontier. It is by reclassifying and transforming a landscape into a frontier 
(supposedly free for the taking) that the resources also are transformed 
from owned to exploitable. The Berger report resulted in a ten year mor-
atorium to clarify land title and prepare for social impacts, but these kinds 
of setbacks to industry are extremely rare, and only come about through 
thoughtful governments intent on using power benignly. 
Interests and Discourse
Mineral resource and oil or gas booms might be the most visible, and 
perhaps most infamous, resource booms today. However, they are obvi-
ously not the only natural resource booms; probably the most common 
are land booms. Whatever the desired resource is, these booms and 
associated frontiers show structural similarities, both in their local mani-
festations and in their general existence. Historically, one of the primary 
similarities was that booms and frontiers were temporary, at least in ex-
pectation. Once the resource—furs, gold, oil, land—was exhausted, the 
area no longer held any interest. This was even true for the seemingly 
most permanent resource: land. As long as the intent is simply to extract 
value from the land—that is, as long as land is seen as an alienable or 
alienated commodity, not a place or a home—there is no incentive to 
expend resources on further investments once the easy returns are gone. 
Historically, this can be seen with the example of agricultural frontiers in 
the United States. 
The plains, David Danbom (2006, 146, 148) has concluded, were set-
tled as a “postindustrial commercial frontier,” and have remained “largely 
colonial, exporting raw commodities and importing capital and manu-
factures.” Looking at this agricultural frontier as an industrial frontier 
indeed shows the similarities to other booms, such as the Bakken. Geoff 
Cunfer (2005, 219) describes the necessity of the constantly moving ag-
ricultural frontier in the United States based on soil depletion, “a farm 
system that mined soil nutrients.” Once a particular frontier had run its 
course, and land as a natural resource had been depleted, a new frontier 
was opened—“there were the farther free lands to which the ruined pi-
oneer could turn” (Turner [1920] 1996, 148). When there were no more 
“free lands” suited for agriculture, however, the frontier was transformed. 
“Rather than adopt one or more of the ancient strategies, farmers (and 
the industrial nation behind them) created a new option. They appro-
priated abundant, cheap fossil-fuel energy to import enormous amounts 
of synthetically manufactured nitrogen onto their fields” (Cunfer 2005, 
219). Ultimately, the land frontier and the fossil fuel frontiers are directly 
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linked. This history, however, leaves out several aspects of frontiers and 
booms, most importantly the legal implications and the global conse-
quences of resource frontiers. 
Governments of expanding states are always interested in advancing 
frontiers, as discussed in part because their frontiers appropriate the 
homes of others. However, they are not necessarily interested, at least not 
in the modern, capitalist state, in pouring resources into these frontiers. 
Just as they are for businesses, frontiers are extractive for governments, 
too. In the United States, this has historically resulted in government 
disposing of newly acquired territories to private individuals—“the distri-
bution of the public domain,” as one author called it (Klose 1964, 98–104). 
After all, the “free land,” and other “free” resources were only “free” for 
the taking because the state directly or indirectly imposed and enforced 
the fact. The political dynamics at work can be seen on the plains in the 
subsidized, land-grant railroads, beginning with the Pacific Railroad Act 
of 1862.1 On a global stage, the quest for fertilizer before the advent of 
synthetic nitrogen led to the opening of new frontiers with the Guano 
Islands Act of 1856, which enabled the appropriation of any “island, rock, 
or key” with guano deposits, for the sole purpose of allowing the com-
mercial extraction of that resource. After the resource was depleted, the 
United States was in no way obligated to keep the territory (or any re-
sponsibilities for it) (Foster 2000, 150–151).2
Resource booms do not exist, and never have come into existence, as 
a function of an essential need for more resources. Such an interpretation 
leaves out the political, social, cultural, legal, and environmental contexts 
of booms. It could be argued that the growth-imperative of modern 
capitalist economies has to lead to constant expansion into territories of 
cheap resources and labor. However, just like the expansion of the Inca 
and Aztec empires was not a function of religion, and religion did not 
have the purpose to serve as a legitimization of expansion (Conrad and 
Demarest 1984, 191–209), so, too, can we not interpret economics from a 
functionalist perspective only. The establishment of resource frontiers is 
a social, cultural, and political choice. It is embedded in other discourses, 
and partially dependent on them, but it is a voluntary activity. The nature 
of resource frontiers, too, is dependent on cultural choices. Mississippian 
buffer zones, for example, were used for resource extraction, but they 
1 I have argued elsewhere that 1862 marked the beginning of the true 
colonization of the plains. In conjunction with the Pacific Railroad Act, the 
Morrill Act and the Homesteading Act prepared this. See Braun (2009).
2 See also 2011 U.S. Code, Title 48—Territories and Insular Possessions, 
Chapter 8—Guano Islands (§§1411–19).
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looked very different from other frontiers. Their depletion probably led 
to societal collapse (Anderson 1990, 205–6). This might be true for all 
resource frontiers, but a global economy can exploit more alternative 
niches and therefore can hide the collapse longer. While the goal for a 
buffer zone was to be sustainable, the goal for extractive resource fron-
tiers, especially booms, is not to be sustainable, but to provide as much 
economic profit as possible. We have to be careful not to infuse local 
peoples with ecological wisdom (Krech 1999), but the decision to leave 
intact resources that could be extracted is possible, an available choice.3
What resources are extracted, how, and how a frontier should look, 
then, are choices that are up for debate. However, because resource ex-
traction in boom frontiers is in the interest of the state or of corporations, 
and because the legality and legitimacy of frontiers are often tenuous at 
best, an open debate might not be in the best interest of powerful stake-
holders. Instead, most frontiers are enshrined in a hegemonic discourse. 
As mentioned, in the Bakken, and in other oil and gas booms in the early 
twenty-first century, this discourse is dominated by the idea that these 
booms save the state and the people. The urgency to extract resources as 
fast as possible in order to jumpstart the national and regional economy, 
to provide energy security, and to provide jobs thus merges with the old 
ideas of the frontier as the bringer or guarantor of American wellbeing 
and identity. These booms are also positioned in a context in which the 
“focus of government policy [has] shifted to making the world a more 
hospitable place for American business.” This is nothing new, as in re-
ality, “the heads of US-based corporations” were always the frontiersmen 
(Byers 2005). The myth of the American frontier is anchored in the 
lone, individual hero (Sardar and Davies 2002), but in reality, frontiers 
were controlled (and financed) by private and state capital, from railroad 
barons to ranch empires, from government agencies to multinational cor-
porations. Local people often experience booms and frontiers as chaotic 
and uncontrollable, but this might more be a consequence of not being 
privy to the planning decisions. 
The discourse in the Bakken has been stressing that corporations 
might move somewhere else if the state is not lenient in regulating them. 
State regulators and legislators have been especially wary of environ-
mental regulations that might slow the rate of development, warning of 
EPA regulations on hydraulic fracturing (Donovan 2011), just as they 
have warned against EPA regulations on coal power plant emissions 
(Nowatzki 2014). This discourse is nationally organized, for example 
3 For example, in the Ecuadorian Amazon; for a general argument on this see 
Grober (2012).
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through groups like the American Legislative Exchange Council (Gold-
enberg 2014; Yeatman 2013). “Decades worth of oil, natural gas, coal and 
uranium are once again within reach—along with many thousands of 
jobs and trillions of dollars in government revenues,” wrote one author; 
yet, “almost as quickly as technologies and discoveries are announced, 
national environmentalist groups, local activists, bureaucrats, courts 
and politicians proclaim their opposition, based on potential to specu-
lative risks to air quality, groundwater, endangered species or Earth’s 
climate, or on resistance to energy projects and facilities in their back 
yards” (Driessen 2010, 3). The discourse is so pervasive that in my own 
research on boom impacts, I have learned of and met faculty at regional 
institutions and employees at federal agencies reluctant to engage in any 
research or data sharing activities that might be seen as directed against 
the interests of industry. This includes basic research on air and water 
quality, or the sharing of public satellite images. One of the best examples 
of this discourse came in the summer 2012, when I attended the Energy 
Impact Solutions Conference at Minot State University. John Hurlimann, 
the presenter on “Statewide Community Resilience for North Dakota” 
and working for Dickinson State University, was talking about the dan-
gers of terrorism for the Bakken boom, in a passage that merits quoting 
in full:
I know, people look at me like I’m crazy when I talk about terror-
ists, and we are becoming more of a terrorist target in this country, 
right now, uh, for a couple reasons. We have two groups that don’t 
want to see a lot of things going on here. One are the environmen-
talists, and, trust me, you read the blogs, and I mean they would 
just as soon close down the coal and everything else we have. The 
EPA is a good example of that, uhm … and, sorry, Senator Con-
rad’s office, but, uhm … they passed a rule last year that said any 
power plant that uses coal will be fined unless it changes to a new 
biodegradable fuel. The problem was, this fuel has not been in-
vented yet. But their argument was that they’re gonna fine people 
anyway because that was an encouragement for them to invent the 
fuel. So, I mean, that’s what we’re dealing with sometimes with 
these people.4
Maybe because this was North Dakota, nobody raised an eyebrow at this 
equation of a federal agency with terrorism because the agency is trying to 
4 The quote in full is transcribed from the DVD of the conference presentations 
Energy Impact Solutions Conference, Tuesday, August 14, 2012. In possession of 
author.
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regulate the energy industry. The example showcases how hegemonic the 
discourse of the resource extraction frontier as an economic enterprise in 
the interest of the state has become. To put this into historical context, 
the land boom that populated the plains in the late nineteenth century 
was in part fueled by a discourse of rain-making through “pluviculture” 
and other schemes, a discourse that “was understandably popular in a land 
where dreams were much more pleasant than realities” (Danbom 2006, 
145).
 
Realities
In reality, booms are never only pleasant, not the current oil boom, nor 
the fur trade, nor uranium mining, nor gold rushes, nor the land boom 
in the nineteenth century. Less than 20 percent of homesteaders on the 
plains stayed on the plots they settled first. They found that the envi-
ronments did not adhere to the dreams of pluviculture. However, “such 
a constrained environment is not likely to be accompanied by limited 
expectations by people from modern industrial cultures” (Bennett 1996, 
261). People who believe in the hegemony of technological and industrial 
solutions did not and do not expect to have their dreams shattered by 
local realities. In essence, that is why booms occur: there is a disconnect 
between the lived realities of local people and the dreams of strangers, 
who flock to boom regions. Because booms are temporary phenomena, 
and because capital can be controlled globally, frontier realities of local 
people also often do not match those of outsiders. 
In addition, booms create status divisions. Oil and gas booms, for ex-
ample, create divisions between those who own mineral rights and earn 
royalties and those who do not, yet have to live with all the disturbances 
that are necessary to create their neighbors’ new wealth (Hudson and 
Braun 2013). Simona Perry (2012) describes the impacts by hegemonic 
discourse, wealth differentiation, and the influx of strangers on com-
munities in the Marcellus Shale as “collective trauma.” Her description 
of local realities under boom conditions are very similar to community 
impacts in other resource frontier situations. Accounts of the Marcellus 
fracking boom show how the initial local enthusiasm—fueled by dreams 
of poverty relief, national recognition, and patriotism—disappeared when 
it became clear to some in these communities that this development had 
divided communities and sometimes families, had the potential to create 
great environmental harm, and would ultimately mostly benefit outsiders 
(McGraw 2011; Wilber 2012). While in the abstract, booms have a pos-
itive economic impact on an international, national, regional, and local 
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level, the impact on local people cannot be captured by general statistics 
or numbers alone. 
Only in very abstract terms can economic growth be used to define 
development because it is mostly meaningless for people in communities. 
As has become increasingly evident, economic recovery has been discon-
nected from employment opportunities, for example. In other words, 
“the ‘trickle-down effect’ rarely takes place; growth does not necessarily 
lead to enhanced standards of living. As societies in the affluent North 
demonstrate, the increased use of highly sophisticated technology or a 
fast-growing GNP does not necessarily eradicate poverty, illiteracy or 
homelessness, although it may well alter the ways these ills are experi-
enced” (Gardner and Lewis 1996, 7). In the case of resource booms like 
the Bakken, it is easily arguable that homelessness increases and educa-
tion is disincentivized. Like other booms, the Bakken has in part led to 
the deterritorialization of locals, who either cannot afford to pay hugely 
inflationary rents or have their subsistence activities disrupted by min-
eral rights owners. The lure of quick money is, at least from anecdotal 
evidence, also leading large numbers of young people to forgo higher 
education.
The majority of local residents in the Bakken, in my experience, still 
look at the extraction of natural resources as a positive development. 
Many have come to see the boom in a different light, though, and ques-
tion whether extraction has to be hurried, or whether it can be carefully 
thought through, well-regulated, and supervised. The issue for them is 
not whether or not extraction should take place. “The key issue is,” as 
Young (1995, 183) pointed out for mining in Australia, “aboriginal [or 
local] control over deciding where [extraction] can take place and how its 
benefits will flow through to the community.” The loss of local control, 
“the most serious consequence of ‘development’” (Bennett 1996, 347), 
along with alienation from the earth and from one another have long 
been recognized as two conditions of capitalism (Foster 2000). They flow 
as necessities out of the prioritization of economic capital and growth, 
the simplification of context for the sake of efficiency (Dussel 1998, 13). 
In frontier situations, this can mean the exclusion of local concerns, as 
the preexisting local is denied under the assumptions of wilderness; in 
boom situations, the local is denied under the assumption of overarching 
economic or political interests.
While some authors may argue for at least the potential of a “sus-
tainable boom” (Parlow 2011), I see that idea as an oxymoron. But even 
if booms were “sustainable” (what exactly would that mean5—and is it 
5 See Grober (2012, 17–21) and Boff (1997, 128–29).
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not in the definition of “boom” that it will go bust?), they contribute to 
new inequalities. I have argued that “the proper goal for a contextualized 
economy is not only materially healthy communities but also spiritually, 
ecologically, and physically healthy communities” (Braun 2008, 177). In 
1869, the naturalist Alfred Russel Wallace wrote that we “should now 
clearly recognize the fact, that the wealth and knowledge and culture of 
the few do not constitute civilization, and do not of themselves advance 
us towards the ‘perfect social state’” (Wallace 2000, 457). Poverty, power, 
and sovereignty are evident factors in the hydraulic fracturing booms of 
the early twenty-first century. Poor communities need income and jobs, 
and they do not have the luxury of asking whether they agree with how 
these are generated, or whether the mode of production will destroy their 
communities in a few generations’ time (Braun 2008). In other words, 
they do not have, or feel they do not have, the privilege of sovereignty, 
a good that has increasingly become a luxury of “the few.” This can, for 
example, be seen by an analysis of decision making processes during an-
other energy boom opportunity in North Dakota, the coal-gasification 
boom of the early 1970s in Mercer County (Tauxe 1993, 138–44). Energy 
development can be beneficial to local communities. In order for that to 
happen, however, they need to regain control, which sets up a built in 
conflict over sovereignty between local and outside interests. 
The way these conflicts have been fought may perhaps best be seen 
by the experience of Native communities, who have been embroiled in 
struggles over sovereignty for a long time (Ambler 1990). Energy and 
other resource booms have affected indigenous communities for centu-
ries, and several, especially Fort Peck and Fort Berthold, have been in the 
center of different oil booms on the northern plains. It is an expression 
of the ways in which power inequalities are mustered in the interests of 
the state and industry when local people express feelings of being treated 
“like Indians” when they feel disappropriated by governments (Tauxe 
1993, 145; Wagoner 2002). Patricia Limerick has pointed to western 
ranchers’ self-perception as victims in the wake of the sagebrush rebel-
lion, and Lamm and McCarthy also identified themselves with “the New 
Indians,” refusing to “be herded to the new reservations” (Limerick 1987, 
47, 157). In the spring of 2014, militia members from all over the United 
States participated in a successful armed standoff against the Bureau of 
Land Management in Nevada, which was trying to enforce grazing fees 
on public lands against a rancher. These events underscore how much 
frustration government power still creates (e.g., Eowyndbh 2014). They 
also recall, however, the long fight by Western Shoshones Mary and 
Carrie Dann against the BLM and other agencies who do not accept the 
Treaty of Ruby Valley (Luebben 2002), and faintly echo other ongoing 
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fights against treaty violations. Perhaps more interesting than the effort 
to paint oneself as a victim (and write the “old Indians off the page”? 
[Braun 2007, 199]) is that Lamm and McCarthy (1982, 5) start their book 
with a “nightmare” scenario of energy politics, a hypothetical blockade of 
Middle Eastern oil:
The federal government takes immediate action, mandating mas-
sive energy exploration and recovery in the American West. State 
and local laws are overridden as energy profits proliferate across 
the land. The western states are not consulted. They are ignored. 
Their rights are abrogated, their sovereignty destroyed. Energy 
combines, unleashed by the government, invade the West … 
Boomtowns mushroom across the West’s rural face, disfiguring the 
land. Cedar breaks crumble to strip miners, waters fill with toxic 
waste, mountain valleys fall to tractor roads, and evening sunsets 
blaze through polluted air. Ways of life change forever … New 
cities, plagued by crime and violence and nonexistent social and 
economic services, cannot deal with the change.
Apart from the cedars and the mountains, the scenario seems almost pro-
phetic when compared to the local perception of the Bakken boom, and 
many other energy booms in the early twenty-first century—except that 
the government has given the driver’s seat to industry, in part under the 
pressure of political leaders who want to see “energy profits proliferate 
across the land.” 
In the last decade of the twentieth century, some authors thought 
that the western United States had been deindustrialized, that “the fed-
eral government succeeded in transforming the colonial economy of the 
West into a pacesetting technologically advanced economy” (Nash 1999, 
145). Others, however, warned that there had been no real structural 
change. “The form of capital remaking the hinterland may be different, 
the ensuing pace of change may be more immediate, and the remapping 
of regional landscapes may be on a much greater scale, but in terms of 
external influences on local conditions, little has changed. Events in the 
West today differ only in scope and magnitude from the events of 1893, 
when decisions made in transatlantic boardrooms brought immediate 
chaos and suffering to the tiniest of industrial communities in the western 
outback” (Robbins 1994, 194). Lamm and McCarthy (1982, 5–6), too, 
saw western history as a continuity of dependence: “In time, the energy 
rush dies. The boomers disappear. Left behind is a wasteland, its skeletal 
boomtowns and cratered-out landscape a graphic reminder of days past. 
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Western people, pawns in an ugly and endless war, regroup and rebuild. 
And their cyclical history begins again.”
The Real Resource: Water
A cyclical nature is not only a marker of settler history on the plains, and 
of boom-bust economies, but also of the plains ecosystem, especially in 
regards to drought cycles (Clark et al. 2002). Yet, in early 2012, the pre-
dominant water-related metaphor for the Bakken boom did not mention 
drought. Instead, people were framing the boom as a potential tsunami. 
This might have been a response to the 2011 tsunami that had devastated 
the Japanese coast, yet it made perfect sense. The image of an unstop-
pable wave crashing into and over peaceful communities and leaving 
nothing but destruction in its wake captured the fears of locals, both In-
dian and non-Indian. On the Fort Berthold reservation, however, I heard 
another metaphor, too. Several people used the historic flooding of the 
Missouri River as an image to describe their fear for their communities. 
Lake Sakakawea had destroyed communities, livelihoods, and the nation’s 
economy fifty years earlier, leading to lasting dependency (Parker 2011). 
Those events thus capture, on one hand, the fears of destruction at the 
hand of outside forces. For others, they are the reason why the tribe needs 
to invest in and profit from the boom: it presents the chance to finally 
rebuild something akin to what was lost.
Beyond these metaphors, however, lies a greater truth. All the booms 
and frontiers on the plains have one thing in common: water is the key 
resource. Whether it is furs, electricity, gold, uranium, land, or oil that is 
extracted, the ultimate resource for all activities has always been water. 
Water is also at the heart of the Bakken boom, and of fracking booms 
in general. This has two reasons: hydraulic fracturing uses a lot of water, 
and it produces a lot of wastewater. In 1890, John Wesley Powell pointed 
out the centrality of water as a resource for the arid lands of the west. He 
went a step farther, however, and problematized another aspect of water 
as a critical resource, namely commodification and regulation: “The land 
itself is valueless without the water. If a company owns that water, unless 
protected by local, national, or State law in some manner the farmer be-
comes the servant of the company” (Powell 1890, 252). Even in semi-arid 
lands, like the plains, interdependent natural resources “are often set in 
a hair-trigger equilibrium which is quickly upset by uncontrolled use” 
(Leopold 1991, 112–13). Aquifers across the United States and globally 
have been depleted by agriculture and industrial usage and population 
increases (Konikow 2013; Wada et al. 2010).
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According to a brief survey of data from FracFocus.org, a typical 
fracking well in the Bakken needs about two million gallons of water to 
complete. In southern Mountrail County, the range of water used lies 
between 700,000 and 30,000,000 gallons of water; at the beginning of 
June 2014, there were 1,055 wells listed for the county.6 In October 2013, 
809 had been listed. This means that the fracking industry used at least 
400 million gallons of water in one county during these nine months. 
Initial water usage for fracking a well is extended by maintenance usage, 
which amounts to about 600 gallons a day per well (Kiger 2013). In 2012, 
the estimated water usage by the oil industry in the state came to 5.5 
billion gallons (Dalrymple 2013). In 2010, estimates for total usage needs 
in 2025 ranged from 4.5 billion gallons to 9.1 billion gallons per year and 
came to the conclusion that “the only plentiful and dependable supply of 
water for the oil industry in western North Dakota, at projected rates of 
extraction, is the Missouri River system” (Schuh 2010, 43–47). Perhaps 
in part because of the Missouri, water use for fracking is not perceived 
to create a hugely competitive situation in North Dakota, in contrast to 
drought-hit regions with fracking booms, such as Texas (Freyman and 
Salmon 2013). North Dakota also has a more effective regulatory system 
in place. Anyone with a legal interest in land can apply for a water use 
permit; these permits are then examined by the State Water Commission. 
The oil industry has given rise to many water permits being used for 
“water depots,” where the industry buys the water needed for its oper-
ations (Schuh 2010; Western Organization of Resource Councils 2013). 
The system exemplifies the frontier as a place where public resources 
are commodified for the profit of individuals and corporations. However, 
permits limit the quantity of water to be extracted.
Because the future of the oil boom in North Dakota hinges on the 
availability of water from Lake Sakakawea, the state, which is supporting 
the industry, and the federal government, which is trying to regulate the 
water usage in the Missouri River watershed overall, have come into con-
flict. The Corps of Engineers has been playing with the idea of asking 
for a “storage fee” for water from the lake, a notion that the state is re-
jecting out of hand, as it claims the water for itself. If the water belongs 
to the state, water permits could be given for a nominal fee, and the in-
dustry would have cheap access to the critical resource it depends on. In 
2012, the Corps signed a first water agreement, for 1.6 billion gallons. 
In 2010, it had applications for easements for about 11 billion gallons, 
although the amount requested might not be the amount of water that is 
either needed or would be removed (US Army Corps of Engineers 2010; 
6 Data retrieved from FracFocus.org on June 2, 2014.
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Springer 2013). The fact that this conflict mirrors frontier water disputes 
of the nineteenth century, and that water is the actual key resource in 
the Bakken is also illuminated by the response from the Mandan, Hi-
datsa and Arikara Nation on Fort Berthold. In 2012, the Three Affiliated 
Tribes passed a resolution against water agreements by the Corps, noting 
that the “Corps’ proposal to sell or allow the taking of water from Lake 
Sakakawea for use in the oil and gas industry will undermine the Tribes’ 
current plans to market and sell water to the oil and gas industry and 
thereby raise needed revenue” (Tribal Business Council of the Three Af-
filiated Tribes 2012). New communal water delivery systems in northwest 
North Dakota are also counting on industrial sales of water to finance the 
infrastructure. Even if there is enough water, competition between water 
providers to raise revenues for communities is becoming a new economic 
and sociopolitical reality.
Water usage is only one part of the role water plays in hydraulic frac-
turing frontiers; however, the other part is the generation and disposal of 
wastewater. Water is mixed with chemicals before it is injected into wells 
to frack them. That water, as well as additional water, comes back up the 
well, and in contrast to water that is used for agriculture or ethanol or 
coal plants, this water cannot be allowed to reenter the water cycle. The 
only way to legally dispose of it in the Bakken and in most other oil and 
gas shale plays, is to inject it deep into the ground. The illegal way to 
dispose of it is to simply let it drip out of tank trucks while driving along 
the road. However, in North Dakota, as in other states, the Department 
of Health “considers oilfield-produced saltwater (brine) to be an effective 
substitute for commercial dust and ice control products.” As such, brine 
can be spread on dirt roads in winter and summer. The NDDoH notes 
that “wastes are exempt from waste management rules and are not con-
sidered a waste when it is: ‘(2) Used or reused as effective substitutes for 
commercial products’” (North Dakota Department of Health n.d.). Brine 
as a waste product is injected in one of over 30,000 Class II disposal wells 
in the United States. In early 2013, North Dakota was injecting over 19 
million gallons of produced water brine into the “Dakota Formation” per 
day, or over 7 billion gallons a year (Davisson and Luther 2013).7
Deep injection wells are designed to be safeguarding drinking water 
and aquifers, but the regulations are often based on unproven assumptions 
(Lustgarten 2012). A study hypothesizing that fracking itself can change 
the properties of the shale in which it occurs, which could then lead to 
the permeability of assumed stable geological formations, enabling waste 
7 For a discussion of the inconsistencies in nomenclature of formations, see 
Thamke and Craigg (1997, 12–13).
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to travel into other layers, including aquifers, was heavily criticized, in 
part by a consulting firm (Myers 2012; Saiers and Barth 2012; Cohen 
and Andrews 2013). However, other studies have postulated that some of 
the assumed impermeable geological layers might have natural fractures, 
and that brine has contaminated groundwater (Warner et al. 2012). It 
seems that deep injection is relatively safe for now, as long as the in-
jection wells are constructed and maintained well. The volume of waste 
injected, the lack of known data, potential seismic activity caused by in-
jection, and communication between fracked wells, all raise the potential 
for contamination of ground water over the long term. Recent research 
by a consulting company rejecting the permeability of layers comes to the 
conclusion that “where upward flow occurs, both permeability and flow 
rates are low, and therefore, timescales for transport are long” (Flewelling 
and Sharma 2013; Flewelling et al. 2013). Thus, if problems occur, they 
might become noticeable after the industry has left the region. 
Most contamination issues exist from improper handling, storage, and 
well construction. The potential for contamination of drinking water in 
shallow aquifers on the northern plains is demonstrated on Fort Peck, 
where brine has contaminated drinking water and the Poplar River since 
the 1970s. To reduce the threat to groundwater serving three thousand 
people in the Poplar area, remediation systems were established (Thamke 
and Craigg 1997; Thamke and Smith 2014). Potential water contamina-
tion and other health risks, such as air pollution (McKenzie et al. 2012), 
have led to calls for the inclusion of a comprehensive public health ap-
proach to discussions on hydraulic fracturing development (Mackie et 
al. 2013). It is, of course, the presence of such planning discussions that 
mark the absence of a frontier, or a boom. Comprehensive planning and 
regulations mark not necessarily an economic bust, but the fact that the 
state is changing its interests from securing resources for individuals and 
corporations to a public safety enforcement.
Conclusions
Industrial booms are nothing new to the global or national landscapes, nor 
are they new to the northern plains. Recurrent waves of frontiers, each 
one extracting resources a little more difficult to get at, have swept the re-
gion. As all frontiers, each visitation has disrupted those tied to place, and 
shifted economic and political power to those not related to the region 
and those who disentangle themselves from such ties. “Today’s disintegra-
tion of rural life,” wrote Osha Gray Davidson (1990, 159), “the breakup of 
families, small-town organizations, and whole communities—fits the pat-
tern established by colonial powers throughout the Third World.” There 
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is a connection between inequality, dependence, poverty, and frontier re-
source extraction: the first three create a society where “civic culture” is 
more likely absent (Duncan 1999), and that enables the establishment of a 
frontier economy. Frontiers are economic and political patterns that take 
advantage of and create more inequality. They persist until one of two 
things happens: either the resources are depleted and capital leaves, or 
some beneficiaries successfully (re-)build a civic culture. In the first case, 
local communities are left with depleted resources and nothing to show 
for it. In the second case, the frontier transforms into a stable, regulated 
economic and political environment. This transformation, however, also 
needs to accomplish a successful economic diversification, or the stability 
will be a delusion. Brian Black (2000, 187) describes the dreams for such 
a transformation for the region around Petrolia, where “delusions of per-
manence had been based on a finite resource; it was a lesson about the 
nature of the oil industry.” That lesson has been learned by planners in 
North Dakota as they attempt to attract families, to build infrastructure 
and subdivisions, and to advertise the Williston Basin as a sustainable 
boom. The underlying dependence on a finite resource, however, raises 
the specter of yet another bust.
Facing the spectacular end of the land boom on the plains in the years 
after the Dust Bowl, the Great Plains Committee came to the conclusion 
that hubris and ignorance about geographic, climatic, and environmental 
conditions had been mainly to blame. Although “an inherent character-
istic of pioneering settlement,” the assumption that “Nature is something 
to take advantage of and to exploit” was obviously a mistake. Since natural 
resources are actually not inexhaustible, the report advocated for con-
servation instead of temporary economic profiteering. It also, however, 
pointed out that “under pioneering conditions … if anyone acquired 
some portion of the free natural resources and turned it into productive 
use, he was … rendering a service to the entire society”; yet, in hindsight, 
“only too frequently what appears to be of immediate good to the indi-
vidual in the long run is not good for the people of the region, and even 
for the individual” (Great Plains Committee 1947, 63–64). Local control 
cannot mean handing that control to economic interests that are often 
not tied to local communities. Local sovereignty over resources needs 
longterm wisdom and regulations, and outside control needs insight and 
deference to local needs and wants. Neither is given in frontier situations. 
In 1924, Aldo Leopold advocated that “uncontrolled use of one local re-
source may menace the economic system of whole regions. Therefore, 
to protect the public interest, certain resources must remain in public 
ownership, and ultimately the use of all resources will have to be put 
under public regulation, regardless of ownership” (Leopold 1991, 113). 
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This advice, namely to keep decisions about natural resources outside the 
influence of economic interests, would end frontiers and regulate booms. 
The crux is, of course, as it has been ever since the American settle-
ment of the West, what “public interest” means. For Leopold and others, 
it was the defense of the community and the environment upon which the 
community rests against corporate interests and those wanting to exploit 
“free” resources. This is still the interpretation of communities, for ex-
ample, that have passed no fracking ordinances in order to safeguard their 
water. It is hard to reconcile such a notion with contemporary practices of 
states, however. Providing free resources to individuals and corporations 
so they can profit from them hardly protects the public interest, unless, of 
course, the public interest is identical with corporate interests. This is, of 
course, what lobbying groups such as the American Legislative Exchange 
Council postulate. 
The public interest in natural resource has been interpreted in the 
interests of the state since the 1930s at least. In the case of water, the Ten-
nessee Valley Authority and the Pick-Sloan dams on the upper Missouri 
are testimony to that. Energy extraction—with or without fracking—as 
a national interest follows the same trajectory. However, there is a dif-
ference between a resource being appropriated by the state and a state 
giving free reign over a resource to corporations. The latter, which cre-
ates the frontier extraction model, may fall into the current trend for 
states to clear the way for business interests. I have to admit, however, 
that this leaves me deeply suspicious. Imagine watching a movie in which 
the sheriff tells John Wayne or Gregory Peck that they cannot help poor 
ranchers fight for their right to water because the rich water barons need 
to make more money off them. 
Boosterism has always accompanied frontiers, just as it does in the 
Bakken today. Yet boosterism works only by abstracting specific positive 
elements of booms from their contexts, and then claiming they stand 
for the whole. “Pluviculture” never worked in context; the rain does not 
follow the plow, even if at times, it might rain after somebody plows. Nei-
ther is it true that “the lesson of history is that in free societies individuals 
produce more energy than they consume” (Bradly and Fulmer 2004). The 
first law of thermodynamics has something to say about that. Neither is 
it true that “‘non-renewable’ energy sources have become more abun-
dant” (Desrochers 2005)—we have just happened to find more, like in the 
Bakken. But ultimately, no amount of boosterism can realistically deny 
that the Bakken needs to be analyzed in the appropriate, historical and 
contemporary, global context of energy, environment, and politics. 
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